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Cognitive control is by now a large umbrella term referring collectively to multiple processes
that plan and coordinate actions to meet task goals. A common feature of paradigms that
engage cognitive control is the task requirement to select relevant information despite a
habitual tendency (or bias) to select goal-irrelevant information. At least since the 1970s,
researchers have employed proportion congruent (PC) manipulations to experimentally
establish selection biases and evaluate the mechanisms used to control attention. PC
manipulations vary the frequency with which irrelevant information conflicts (i.e., is incon-
gruent) with relevant information. The purpose of this review is to summarize the growing
body of literature on PC effects across selective attention paradigms, beginning first with
Stroop, and then describing parallel effects in flanker and task-switching paradigms. The
review chronologically tracks the expansion of the PC manipulation from its initial imple-
mentation at the list-wide level, to more recent implementations at the item-specific and
context-specific levels. An important theoretical aim is demonstrating that PC effects at
different levels (e.g., list-wide vs. item or context-specific) support a distinction between
voluntary forms of cognitive control, which operate based on anticipatory information, and
relatively automatic or reflexive forms of cognitive control, which are rapidly triggered by
the processing of particular stimuli or stimulus features. A further aim is to highlight those
PC manipulations that allow researchers to dissociate stimulus-driven control from other
stimulus-driven processes (e.g., S-R responding; episodic retrieval). We conclude by dis-
cussing the utility of PC manipulations for exploring the distinction between voluntary
control and stimulus-driven control in other relevant paradigms.
Keywords: cognitive control, proportion congruent, Stroop, flanker, voluntary control, stimulus-driven control
INTRODUCTION
Selective attention paradigms such as Stroop and flanker tasks con-
trast performance on incongruent (i.e., incompatible) trials where
multiple responses are activated by a stimulus (e.g., naming the
ink color of the word RED in blue ink; responding to the cen-
tral arrow in <<<><<<) to congruent (i.e., compatible) trials
where a single response is activated by a stimulus (e.g., naming the
ink color of the word RED in red ink; responding to the central
arrow in >>>>>>>). Interference effects emerge in such tasks
with slowed (and sometimes more errant) responding on incon-
gruent/incompatible trials relative to congruent/compatible trials.
Although interference effects are routinely observed, their magni-
tude varies substantially as a function of theoretically important
factors (e.g., working memory capacity, age, and clinical status).
Of current interest is a factor termed proportion congruent (PC),
referring to the proportion of trials that are congruent. PC dra-
matically modulates the size and even the direction (Logan and
Zbrodoff, 1979) of the interference effect. Paradigms with mostly
congruent trials (typically 67–80%) produce significantly larger
interference effects than paradigms with mostly incongruent trials.
This review summarizes the growing literature on PC effects
and examines the theoretically important question of what these
effects signify about cognitive control. Part of the answer rests on
careful consideration of the various ways that PC is manipulated.
PC has been manipulated on three distinct levels: the list-wide
level (e.g., separate blocks of trials are mostly congruent or incon-
gruent); the item level (e.g., particular words are mostly congruent
or incongruent); and the context level (e.g., items presented in one
context are mostly congruent, but mostly incongruent in a differ-
ent context). One goal of the review is to convince the reader that
manipulations of PC at each level shed light on qualitatively differ-
ent cognitive control processes. List-level control operates based
on anticipatory information whereas item- and context-level con-
trol are rapidly triggered by the occurrence of particular stimuli
or stimulus features. List-level PC manipulations index a more
voluntary form of cognitive control, whereas item- and context-
level PC manipulations index a reflexive or stimulus-driven form
of cognitive control. In light of findings in the PC literature, a sec-
ond over-arching goal of the review is to reconsider definitions of
cognitive control, and we propose one that blends conventionally
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separate notions of controlled and automatic processes. Redefin-
ing cognitive control in this fashion suggests a need for new
terminology to better describe the processes and representations
affording control.
THE MANY FACES OF COGNITIVE CONTROL
Cognitive control is by now a large umbrella term referring collec-
tively to multiple processes that plan and coordinate behavior to
meet task goals. According to convention, controlled processes are
contrasted with automatic processes (Posner and Snyder, 1975;
Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977). Controlled processes are volun-
tary, effortful, slow, and flexible. They prepare plans or task-
sets that configure attention to selectively process task-relevant
information during task performance. Automatic processes are
involuntary, effortless, fast, and inflexible. They operate indepen-
dently from controlled processes and may cause stimuli to capture
attention or to retrieve associated responses. Strongly automatic
processes are said to be cognitively impenetrable, or not under
control. The controlled vs. automatic dichotomy has productively
guided research in attention and performance over several decades.
The PC literature has benefited from this distinction, but it has
also produced new evidence challenging the dichotomy and con-
ventional terminology by demonstrating that attentional control
can occur in an automatic fashion. The oxymoronic term “auto-
matic control” was coined by Jacoby et al. (2003) to describe these
effects (p. 643). A contention of this review is that the controlled vs.
automatic dichotomy should be abandoned and replaced by termi-
nology that better characterizes the continuum between controlled
and automatic processing (Bugg et al., 2008; Egner, 2008).
The terminology that we suggest here takes the general theory
of attention and action (Norman and Shallice, 1986; Cooper and
Shallice, 2000) as a starting point. Before elaborating on the major
points we first describe some considerations about the concept of
cognitive control that led us to adopt the terminology. The word
control has different connotations for different researchers. For
example, consider how cognitive vs. motor control differ.
Cognitive control refers to anticipatory, preparatory, endoge-
nous, proactive, strategic, or voluntary processes that create, main-
tain, or adjust plans, task-sets, and attentional filters during perfor-
mance. The spirit of this kind of control is top-down, supervisory,
or executive in the sense that goals for performance are planned,
monitored, and adjusted for success. In everyday life these con-
trol processes aid people in planning, thinking, and deciding on
actions that will help them obtain their goals. For example, plan-
ning a driving route to run errands, focusing on a conversation
with a friend in a crowded room, or surveying the field and choos-
ing to pass to a teammate rather than an opponent in sports all
rely on cognitive control processes.
Motor control refers to the processes and representations that
coordinate actions. Current theories of motor control assume that
motor schemas provide plans for action that are carried out by the
motor system, and that online feedback from the environment and
from internal simulations of the ongoing action can update and
adjust movements to keep them in line with the action plan (Jor-
dan and Rumelhart, 1992; Miall and Wolpert, 1996). Some aspects
of motor control overlap with cognitive control. For example, like
cognitive control, actions are planned, monitored, and adjusted by
the motor system. As well, people have voluntary control of their
actions. By contrast, other aspects of motor control, like the devel-
opment of highly trained motor skills, overlap with the concept of
automaticity. For example, the motor skills involved in driving a
car are a common example of learned automatic routines. Many
drivers have experienced arriving at an unintended destination
like their place of work (when they originally planned a trip to the
grocery store) as if they were driving on auto-pilot.
The differences between cognitive and motor control do not fit
neatly into the controlled vs. automatic dichotomy, but instead
speak to different levels of control. One important difference
between levels is proximal vs. distal control. Proximal control refers
to the representations, such as motor schemas, stimulus-response
associations, and task-set representations that directly coordinate
attention and action. Distal control refers to the control of proxi-
mal control; for example, by voluntary processes that select among
motor schemas or task-sets, or as will be further developed in this
review by exogenous cuing of proximal control representations.
Proximal control most closely resembles automatic process-
ing. Automatic processes are commonly thought to be exogenous,
involuntary, implicit, ballistic, reactive, cue/stimulus-driven, and
cognitively impenetrable, or not under voluntary control; regard-
less, automatic processes are a fundamental component of control
(cf. Hommel, 2007): they directly coordinate complex routine
behaviors, and in this sense reflect proximal control of attention
and action.
The interplay between proximal and distal control is insight-
fully framed by general theories of attention and action (Norman
and Shallice, 1986; Cooper and Shallice, 2000). We outline the the-
ory and consider its use for characterizing the multiple levels of
control newly evidenced by the PC literature. The theory posits
the supervisory and contention scheduling systems. The supervi-
sory system is the distal controller, executive, or homunculus. This
system “knows” current goals for action, and monitors the output
of actions to ensure that goals are achieved. The system provides
course correction and signals adjustments or new actions when the
direction of performance has gone astray. The contention sched-
uling system is the workhorse and houses the proximal control
representations or action schemas for familiar routines. Schemas
refer to task and attentional sets, stimulus-response associations,
and motor plans that provide the recipes for action needed to
accomplish performance goals and sub-goals.
A fundamental assumption of the theory is that proximal
representations are themselves controlled by either exogenous
or endogenous means. Exogenous control refers to stimulus or
cue-driven activation of associated proximal representations. For
example, a coffee cup can trigger the motor movements needed
to reach and grasp for the cup. Endogenous control refers to the
supervisory system superseding ongoing activation of proximal
representations that may lead performance astray. For example, a
yellow traffic light could trigger a braking schema, but viewing an
oncoming tailgater in the rear-view mirror could initiate supervi-
sory intervention to inhibit the braking operation, and activate the
schema for driving through an intersection to prevent an accident.
Exogenous and endogenous forms of control are both distal in the
sense that they act on the proximal representations that directly
coordinate attention and action.
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The theory highlights the terms proximal vs. distal control and
exogenous vs. endogenous control and in doing so, preserves much
of the spirit of the controlled vs. automatic distinction. Voluntary
processes are capable of monitoring and adjusting attention and
action, and stimuli are capable of triggering associated responses
on a non-voluntary basis. In some sense the terminology simply re-
casts “automatic” processes as proximal control, and “controlled”
processes as those involved distally in the control of control. How-
ever, the theory also captures important nuances needed to explain
emerging findings in the PC literature. For example, the conven-
tional controlled vs. automatic dichotomy does not aptly describe
situations where stimuli in the environment trigger adjustments
to attentional filtering that occur in a rapid-online fashion and
without awareness. Here proximal control is achieved through an
attentional set that directly enacts attentional filtering operations;
however, the activation of this attentional set is triggered exoge-
nously by associated cues in the environment. Multiple lines of evi-
dence for this kind of stimulus-driven control, which is subserved
by stimulus-attention associations rather than stimulus-response
associations, have emerged from the PC literature, and we advance
the terms proximal vs. distal and exogenous vs. endogenous as
tools for describing these effects in a common terminology.
Although these terms accommodate important themes in the
controlled vs. automatic dichotomy, and do not “throw out the
baby with the bathwater,” they also completely redefine automatic
processes as being fundamental units of control (cf. Hommel,
2007). Automatic processes directly enact control over attention
and action, and are distally controlled by endogenous and exoge-
nous means. After reviewing the PC literature, we clarify these
terms by distinguishing further between low (stimulus-response)
and high (stimulus-attention) levels of proximal control, connect-
ing the terminology to the range of PC phenomena, and discussing
relations between levels of control more generally.
ROADMAP OF THE REVIEW
A general aim of the PC literature has been to better understand the
nature of the representations and processes controlling attention
and action in selective attention tasks. Progress has been made in
clarifying the nature of voluntary strategic processes that influence
attentional selection, and stimulus-driven processes that control
attentional selection and action. We review PC findings first in
the Stroop literature, and then describe parallel developments in
the flanker and task-switching literatures. We focus on list-wide
proportion congruent (LWPC), item-specific proportion congru-
ent (ISPC), and context-specific proportion congruent (CSPC)
manipulations. Then we discuss processes and models that could
explain the findings, and connect insights from the PC litera-
ture for understanding the many faces of cognitive control to the
broader attention and performance literature.
STROOP: LWPC, ISPC, AND CSPC
The Stroop task involves naming the ink-color of a color word
(Stroop, 1935). Identification times are faster for congruent trials
(e.g., the word red in RED ink) than incongruent trials (e.g., the
word red in Blue ink). The RT difference, termed the Stroop effect,
reflects a failure of attention to filter out information from the
distracting word. The size of the Stroop effect can measure the
effectiveness of the attentional filter. A small Stroop effect indi-
cates strong filtering of distracting information, whereas a large
Stroop effect indicates weak filtering of distracting information.
PC manipulations at the list-wide, item-, and context-specific lev-
els modulate the size of Stroop effects and provide useful tools for
measuring control-based attentional adjustments.
LIST-WIDE PROPORTION CONGRUENT MANIPULATIONS
Many Stroop tasks present 50% congruent and 50% incongru-
ent trials mixed at random. Consequently, participants are unable
to accurately predict whether the next trial will be congruent or
incongruent. LWPC manipulations vary the ratio of congruent
and incongruent trials within a block. A mostly congruent block
might be 75% congruent and 25% incongruent, and a mostly
incongruent block the reverse. Stroop effects are larger for mostly
congruent than mostly incongruent blocks, a finding termed the
LWPC effect (e.g., Shor, 1975; Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Lowe
and Mitterer, 1982; Logan et al., 1984; Cheesman and Merikle,
1986; Lindsay and Jacoby, 1994; West and Baylis, 1998; Kane and
Engle, 2003).
Early accounts of LWPC effects assumed a role for strategic
control. For example, using an ABOVE/BELOW spatial Stroop
paradigm, Logan and Zbrodoff (1979) posited that participants
strategically divide their attention between relevant and irrele-
vant dimensions, weighting the irrelevant dimension more heavily
than the relevant in mostly congruent than mostly incongruent
blocks (see also Logan, 1980; Logan et al., 1984, for evidence with
color-word Stroop; Lowe and Mitterer, 1982). This is because the
irrelevant dimension tends to validly cue the “value” of the rel-
evant dimension (i.e., the response) in a mostly congruent list.
In a similar vein, the dual-mechanisms of control account posits
that participants develop expectancies about upcoming trials and
modulate control proactively (e.g., Braver et al., 2007). When par-
ticipants expect a congruent trial, as in a mostly congruent list,
they may voluntarily pay more attention to the word, which usu-
ally corresponds to the correct response. Such a strategy would
speed processing of congruent items, create strong interference for
incongruent items, and increase the size of the Stroop effect. When
incongruent trials are expected, participants may double-down on
their attempt to filter out word information (i.e., avoid word read-
ing). This strategy would slow down identification for congruent
items (as the word would have less of a facilitating effect), speed
up identification for incongruent items (less interference because
of better attentional filtering), and decrease the size of the Stroop
effect. Such predictions have been confirmed in some studies (e.g.,
Logan and Zbrodoff, 1979; Kane and Engle, 2003, Experiment 4;
West and Baylis, 1998). Moreover, Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) have
provided evidence from a process-dissociation procedure show-
ing that the color-naming process (representing attention to the
relevant dimension) does not vary as a function of LWPC. Rather,
manipulating PC in this fashion produces a selective effect on
the word reading process (representing attention to the irrelevant
dimension). These data also point to a strategy that filters words
differentially for mostly incongruent and mostly congruent lists.
Although strategic explanations of the LWPC effect are both
parsimonious and intuitive, there has been much recent debate
over the kinds of processes that may account for PC modulations
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to Stroop, including the LWPC effect. Not all accounts suggest use
of a mechanism that relies on information about the list (i.e., the
likelihood that the irrelevant dimension will be valid; the likeli-
hood that trials will be incongruent) to strategically alter attention
in advance of stimulus presentation. A competing account attrib-
utes LWPC effects to item-specific mechanisms (Bugg et al., 2008;
Blais and Bunge, 2010) that operate only after a stimulus has been
presented,and rely on information about particular stimuli. Before
fully considering this account, we describe such item-specific
mechanisms.
ITEM-SPECIFIC PROPORTION CONGRUENT MANIPULATIONS
A formative innovation was to manipulate PC at the level of indi-
vidual items, rather than at the list-wide level (Jacoby et al., 2003).
An ISPC manipulation assigns different PC levels to different sets
of items. In the seminal study, Jacoby et al. (2003) assigned par-
ticular words to be mostly congruent or mostly incongruent. For
example, the words RED and WHITE could be 80% congruent
and 20% incongruent, whereas the words BLACK and GREEN
could be 20% congruent and 80% incongruent. The mostly con-
gruent and mostly incongruent items were randomly intermixed,
resulting in a LWPC of 50/50 congruent and incongruent trials.
Thus, participants were unable to predict whether an upcoming
trial would be congruent or incongruent. That is, there was no
basis for participants to form a list-wide strategy to increase word
reading or filter out words. Still, a PC effect was observed indi-
cating significantly less interference for mostly incongruent than
mostly congruent items. Jacoby et al. termed this the ISPC effect,
and firmly established that not all PC effects depend on having
advance information about PC such as list-level information. In
the ISPC paradigm, a participant could not know whether the
word on a given trial was from the mostly congruent or mostly
incongruent set until it was presented. As such, implementing a
list-wide strategy to increase or prevent word reading would have
been non-optimal (indeed, the fact that similar Stroop effects were
not obtained for both item-types shows that such a strategy was
not used).
Jacoby et al. (2003) suggested that ISPC effects may reflect rapid,
online, stimulus-driven control over attentional filtering – a kind
of oxymoronic “automatic control” (p. 643). On this view, indi-
vidual items become associated with the attentional filters that
are frequently employed for their respective item-types during
the experimental session. For example, mostly congruent items
become associated with an attentional filter that weakly filters word
information, and mostly incongruent items become associated
with an attentional filter that strongly filters word information (cf.
Trainham et al., 1997; Jacoby et al., 1999). When an item appears
as a stimulus on-screen it reflexively triggers the retrieval of its
associated attentional filter, and this filter rapidly adjusts current
attention settings to provide online control over processing of the
Stroop item. Using the sample stimuli above, the idea is that when
the word BLACK is presented, processing of the word is quickly
attenuated. By contrast, when WHITE is presented, it triggers fuller
processing of the word. In other words, the influence of the word
is controlled at the item level, with the item itself acting as the
environmental cue to enact a particular attentional set. Consis-
tent with this view, process-dissociation estimates indicated that,
like the LWPC manipulation, the ISPC manipulation was associ-
ated with a change in the contribution of the word process, and
no change in the contribution of the color process across mostly
incongruent and mostly congruent items (Jacoby et al., 2003).
An alternative view of the ISPC effect centers on an item-
specific associative learning mechanism that capitalizes on the
frequency with which particular words and colors are paired in
ISPC designs (Jacoby et al., 2003). ISPC manipulations introduce
item-frequency as a confound and ISPC effects could reflect that
participants learn to respond faster to high than low frequency
word-color pairs (Logan, 1988). Mostly congruent item-types
repeat specific congruent items frequently and specific incon-
gruent items infrequently (sometimes never repeated in a single
block). By contrast, mostly incongruent item-types may repeat
specific incongruent items frequently and specific congruent items
infrequently. As such, the ISPC effect may reflect speeded respond-
ing for high-frequency items. In a similar vein, Schmidt and Besner
(2008) suggested that because PC is confounded with contingency,
a stimulus-response contingency-learning process may account
for the ISPC effect. By their contingency account, the reason par-
ticipants are faster in responding to congruent trials for mostly
congruent than mostly incongruent items, and in responding to
incongruent trials for mostly incongruent than mostly congruent
items, is not due to item-specific control. Rather, they purport that
participants learn the correlations between particular words and
colors (cf. Musen and Squire, 1993; Dishon-Berkovits and Algom,
2000; Melara and Algom, 2003) and use the word to predict high
contingency responses (colors). Again using the sample stimuli
above, the idea is that participants learn to say “green” whenever
BLACK is presented and “white” whenever WHITE is presented.
The contingency account contends that the ISPC effect is entirely
due to these contingency-learning processes and attentional mod-
ulation based on PC (i.e., item-specific control) plays no role in
the effect.
Disentangling item-specific control and contingency learning
Item-specific control and contingency-learning accounts of the
ISPC effect both assume a stimulus-driven control process, how-
ever they differ on the nature of the proximal representations
enacting control. The contingency-learning account assumes that
stimulus-response associations are the representation control-
ling action. The item-specific control account further assumes
stimulus-attention associations: stimuli are associated with self-
tailored attentional sets triggering rapid-online filtering of irrel-
evant information. There has been much debate in the literature
over the contribution of item-specific control and item-specific
contingency learning to ISPC effects. This question has been
addressed in three ways: (a) by providing direct empirical evidence
for the contingency account, and by crafting (b) item-specific
designs, and (c) higher-order context-specific designs that rule
out, or control for the influence of learning stimulus-response
contingencies.
The primary evidence in favor of the contingency-learning
account stems from Schmidt and Besner (2008, but see also
Schmidt et al., 2007; Hutchison, 2011; Atalay and Misirlisoy,
2012) who re-analyzed Jacoby et al. (2003) to de-confound PC
and contingency. Instead of conducting the standard analysis
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that compares Stroop interference for mostly congruent items
(i.e., incongruent-congruent) to mostly incongruent items (i.e.,
incongruent-congruent), they used a contingency analysis to con-
trast interference for items that were equated in contingency (e.g.,
high contingency trials: mostly incongruent-incongruent – mostly
congruent–congruent; low-contingency trials: mostly congruent
incongruent – mostly incongruent-congruent). They predicted
and confirmed that the contingency analysis would yield main
effects of trial type and contingency but no interaction. Accord-
ing to Schmidt and Besner, the absence of the interaction was a
key piece of evidence countering the item-specific control account,
because accounts emphasizing modulation of word reading would
predict “incongruent trials should be more affected by attention,
given that the majority of the Stroop effect is interference with
little or no facilitation from congruent trials” (p. 516).
Although Schmidt and Besner (2008) provided strong evidence
in favor of the contingency account, Bugg et al. (2011a) questioned
the ubiquity of the account and whether ISPC effects are always
dominated by contingency learning. Their design de-confounded
PC and contingency and permitted examination of the ISPC effect
using the standard analysis approach. The key design feature was
designating the relevant (to-be-named) dimension as the signal
of ISPC rather than the irrelevant dimension, which was used in
prior studies (e.g., Jacoby et al., 2003; Schmidt and Besner, 2008).
When the irrelevant word dimension predicts ISPC, words signal
both information that could be used to modulate word reading,
and the most frequently paired response. When the relevant color
dimension signals ISPC, contingency is equated across all four
cells (combining PC and trial type) because the relevant dimen-
sion is 100% predictive of the correct response in each cell. Per
a contingency account, an ISPC effect should not be obtained in
this design because only PC (and not contingency) differentiates
mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items. According to the
item-specific control account (Bugg et al., 2011a), an ISPC effect
should be obtained because participants use information signaling
PC to modulate reliance on the word dimension.
In the critical experiment providing support for the item-
specific control account, Bugg et al. (2011a, Experiment 2) found
a significant ISPC effect using the above design in a picture-word
Stroop task (“Name animal in picture, ignore word”). Moreover,
the ISPC manipulation had a selective influence on incongruent
trial performance with RTs speeded for the mostly incongruent
than mostly congruent items, a finding consistent with Schmidt
and Besner’s (2008) prediction that a control mechanism would
have a stronger influence on incongruent trials. In addition, Bugg
et al. examined whether participants would transfer the control
settings associated with mostly incongruent and mostly congru-
ent items to a new set of stimuli. Importantly, these stimuli were
new exemplars from the four animal categories that comprised
the relevant dimension for training trials in the first two blocks of
the task. For example, pictures of birds and cats were mostly con-
gruent during training and pictures of dogs and fish were mostly
incongruent during training. During the third block new pictures
of birds, cats, dogs, and fish were presented as transfer trials and
importantly these transfer trials were 50% congruent. Thus, if an
ISPC effect was obtained for the transfer trials, it would suggest that
participants had applied the control settings they associated with
the training trials to these new transfer items. Indeed, transfer was
shown. These findings are theoretically important because they
challenge the contingency account, and other frequency-based
accounts (e.g., Logan, 1988) that predict a RT advantage not only
for mostly incongruent-incongruent trials (as was found) but also
for mostly congruent-congruent trials, which was not observed.
So, where does that leave us? There is clearly evidence support-
ing both the contingency account and the item-specific control
account. Such patterns mirror the original conclusion of Jacoby
et al. (2003) who suggested a role for both processes. While such
a conclusion is reasonably satisfying, it is important to under-
stand the conditions under which one vs. the other dominates.
For example, it would be prudent for researchers interested in
stimulus-driven control to employ the design used by Bugg et al.
(2011a, Experiment 2) rather than Jacoby et al. (2003). Bugg et al.
proposed the basis of the ISPC signal as a design principle to differ-
entiate ISPC designs producing effects reflecting cognitive control
vs. contingency learning. When the relevant dimension signals
ISPC, ISPC effects are control-based (see Bugg et al., Experiments
1 and 2 for support), but when the irrelevant dimension signals
ISPC, effects are contingency-based. In support of the latter, it was
found that when the exact same design was used as in Experiment
2, but words were designated mostly congruent or mostly incon-
gruent, an ISPC effect was obtained but all of the action was in
the congruent trials, consistent with predictions of a contingency
account (Bugg et al., Experiment 3).
Color-word Stroop purists might contend that evidence for
item-specific control in picture-word Stroop does not imply item-
specific control in color-word Stroop. Picture-word and color-
word Stroop effects may tap different processes (but see van
Maanen et al., 2009). For example, Dell’Acqua et al. (2007) exam-
ined the locus of the interference effect in both Stroop tasks
using a psychological refractory period paradigm, and found that
picture-word Stroop interference arises earlier than color-word
Stroop interference. In picture-word Stroop, the locus is the per-
ceptual encoding stage whereas in color-word Stroop the locus is
the response selection stage. Given that interference may serve as
a trigger for item-specific control (e.g., Blais et al., 2007; Braver
et al., 2007), it is possible interference arises too late in color-word
Stroop paradigms for item-specific control to effectively modulate
the influence of the distracting word. Countering this concern,
Bugg and Hutchison (2012) replicated the critical patterns sup-
porting the role of item-specific control in the ISPC effect using a
color-word Stroop paradigm. That is, they showed that when the
relevant dimension (here, color) signaled ISPC, effectively elimi-
nating the confound between PC and contingency, an ISPC effect
was still obtained contrary to the contingency account. In addi-
tion, like the patterns observed in picture-word Stroop (Bugg et al.,
2011a, Experiment 2), the ISPC effect selectively influenced per-
formance on the incongruent trials and transfer of item-specific
control settings was observed for novel 50% congruent trials that
consisted of“old”mostly congruent and mostly incongruent colors
paired with new words. These findings provided further sup-
port for the idea that the locus of the ISPC signal (relevant vs.
irrelevant dimension) is an important factor moderating use of
item-specific control vs. item-specific contingency learning. How-
ever, in another experiment, Bugg and Hutchison showed that this
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view may be overly simplified; signaling ISPC via words can also
produce control-dominated effects.
The goal of that experiment was to return to the original
design of Jacoby et al. (2003) where words signal ISPC and the
confound between PC and contingency is present to determine
whether there are limitations on use of contingency learning in
such designs. Bugg and Hutchison (2012) hypothesized that evi-
dence favoring the contingency account would be limited to a
two-item set design. In a two-item set design, the design that was
used by Jacoby et al. (2003, Experiments 2a, 2b, and 3) and Schmidt
and Besner (2008) in formulating the contingency account, a sin-
gle high contingency response exists for both the mostly congruent
and mostly incongruent word sets. In the mostly congruent set, it
is the congruent response and in the mostly incongruent set, it
is the incongruent response associated with the opposite color in
that set. Contrast this with a four-item set where a single high
contingency response option exists for the mostly congruent set
but does not exist for the mostly incongruent set. There is no high
contingency incongruent response. Rather, there are three equally
probable responses on incongruent trials. This means that par-
ticipants cannot predict with high accuracy the response that is
mostly likely on any incongruent trial during a task that employs
a four-item set. Given these differences, Bugg and Hutchison pre-
dicted that although the word signals ISPC in both a two- and
four-item set, contingency-learning mechanisms would dominate
only in the two-item set.
Two approaches were used to determine the underlying mech-
anism(s) responsible for the ISPC effect in the two- and four-
item sets. The first was to examine the ISPC pattern (Bugg and
Hutchison, 2012). For the two-item set, a symmetrical pattern was
obtained reflecting speeding of RT on congruent trials from the
mostly congruent set and on incongruent trials from the mostly
incongruent set, the two trial types for which a high contingency
response existed. By contrast, a stronger effect of the ISPC manip-
ulation was found for incongruent trials than congruent trials in
the four-item set. In particular, the RT speeding on incongruent
trials in the mostly incongruent as compared to the mostly con-
gruent set was larger than the speeding on congruent trials in the
mostly congruent as compared to the mostly incongruent set, a
pattern that is similar to the control-based ISPC pattern obtained
in prior studies (Bugg and Hutchison, 2012, Experiments 1 and 2;
Bugg et al., 2011a, Experiments 1 and 2).
The second approach was to examine transfer performance in
the two- and four-item sets (Bugg and Hutchison, 2012). Trans-
fer was assessed by presenting “old” mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent words paired with new colors in a final block of trials,
and these transfer items were 50% congruent. Per a contingency
account, transfer should not be obtained because participants have
no prior experience predicting/naming the new transfer colors. Per
an item-specific control account, transfer should be obtained if
participants have learned to use the word to modulate attentional
settings because the old mostly congruent and mostly incongru-
ent words still appear on transfer trials. For the two-item set,
no evidence of transfer was obtained. That is, the magnitude
of interference was similar for the mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent words presented in new colors. By contrast, an ISPC
effect was observed for the transfer items in the four-item set.
Here, less interference was observed when responding to new col-
ors that were paired with words from the mostly incongruent set
than with words from the mostly congruent set. The selective effect
of transfer in the four-item set, in conjunction with the ISPC pat-
tern itself, is consistent with the view that item-specific control
dominated in the four-item set. Participants utilized the word as a
signal of control, quickly attenuating its influence when the word
was mostly incongruent, and more fully processing the word when
the word was mostly congruent. These findings suggest an update
to the item-specific control account in showing that contingency-
learning mechanisms do not always dominate when words are the
signal of ISPC. Rather, contingency learning appears to dominate
under select conditions, such as when a two-item set is used and
high contingency responses can be learned for both congruent and
incongruent trials.
List-wide proportion congruent manipulations: revisited
Previously, we mentioned that some folks have posited accounts of
the LWPC manipulation that are not based on a strategic control
process that prepares attention in advance of stimuli, but instead
reflect the operation of stimulus-driven mechanisms such as item-
specific control and item-specific contingency learning (e.g., Bugg
et al., 2008; Schmidt and Besner, 2008; Blais and Bunge, 2010). The
possibility that LWPC manipulations trigger use of item-specific
mechanisms is bolstered by the fact that LWPC is perfectly con-
founded with ISPC in the standard design used in LWPC studies.
Mostly congruent lists are composed from stimuli that are mostly
congruent at the item level. For example, if four stimuli are used,
each one is presented 75% of the time in a congruent color making
for an ISPC of 75% congruent. In a mostly incongruent list each
of the four stimuli are presented 25% of the time in a congruent
color, such that the stimuli have an ISPC level of 25% congru-
ent. Thus, participants could be modulating word reading on an
item-by-item basis rather than employing a global and sustained
word reading (or word avoiding) strategy. Similarly, participants
could rely on item-specific contingency learning, predicting the
responses that are mostly likely for particular words upon their
presentation.
An initial hint in the literature that the latter type of mech-
anism may be contributing to the LWPC effect was evident in
one of the earliest studies on the effect. Logan et al. (1984) found
that the LWPC effect was robust when two word-color contingen-
cies were present in the lists (Experiments 1 and 2); however, the
LWPC effect was absent when four colors/words were used (Exper-
iment 3). In Experiment 3, each word was paired with only two
possible colors such that four separate word-color contingencies
were present in each list, and high contingency responses could be
predicted on the most frequent trial type within the mostly con-
gruent and mostly incongruent lists. Logan et al. suggested that
the manipulation exceeded capacity limitations; participants could
not keep in mind the four word-color contingencies that existed
within the list and so they abandoned the strategy. Such a finding is
unanticipated by accounts that posit a list-wide strategy of filtering
out words in the mostly incongruent list and fuller processing of
(e.g., reading) words in the mostly congruent list. A word-filtering
strategy should minimize interference in a mostly incongruent list
even when a large number of color-word contingencies are present.
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A number of recent studies have examined whether the LWPC
effect reflects global, list-level modulation of word reading or
the (possibly strategic) learning of contingencies or item-specific
control. Bugg et al. (2008) determined whether a LWPC effect
is observed when item-specific influences are controlled. They
created two sets of items (words/colors). One set of items (e.g.,
GREEN and WHITE) established LWPC. For example, in the
mostly incongruent list, these two items were presented 75% of the
time in the incongruent color associated with the set. In the mostly
congruent list, these two items were presented 75% of the time in
the congruent color. Critically, a second set of items (e.g., RED and
BLUE) was presented 50% of the time as congruent and 50% of
the time as incongruent in both lists. Thus, these items were 100%
identical and presented equally frequently in the mostly congruent
and mostly incongruent lists. The key comparison for evaluat-
ing whether the LWPC effect reflected non-item-level processes
was the magnitude of Stroop interference for the 50% congruent
items in the mostly incongruent vs. mostly congruent list. Con-
trary to list-level control or strategic accounts, the LWPC effect
was limited to the biased set of items (GREEN and WHITE) and
was not obtained for the 50% congruent items that controlled for
item-level influences.
Blais and Bunge (2010) used an almost identical design as Bugg
et al. (2008) and replicated their primary result, again showing no
evidence of list-level control. Moreover, Blais and Bunge had par-
ticipants perform the Stroop task while in an fMRI scanner. They
found that the anterior cingulate and dorsolateral prefrontal cor-
tex, two regions previously implicated in top-down (e.g., list-wide)
control (Botvinick et al., 2001), were selectively activated under
conditions where item-specific control was presumed to operate
(i.e., in contrasts involving the biased set of items). There were no
differences in activation of these regions of interest in contrasts
involving the 50% congruent items across the mostly congruent
and mostly incongruent blocks. Like the findings of Bugg et al.,
these findings strongly challenged the view that list-level control
is a mechanism underlying the LWPC effect.
Bugg and Chanani (2011) pursued the issue further by inves-
tigating whether the use of small stimulus sets precluded list-level
control. When PC is defined by two-item sets, high contingency
responses exist for congruent trials from the mostly congruent
condition and incongruent trials from the mostly incongruent
condition. Bugg and Chanani speculated that participants may
not have engaged list-level control, a putatively more resource
demanding process (cf. Braver et al., 2007), because they were
capable of quickly and accurately performing the task using asso-
ciative learning (prediction of high contingency responses) on
the majority of trials within the mostly congruent and mostly
incongruent lists. So they increased the number of items defin-
ing the PC lists, yet maintained the set size of the 50% congruent
items at two. Using a picture-word Stroop task, birds, dogs, cats,
and fish comprised the biased set and pigs and seals the 50%
congruent set. Again, the key question centered on whether a
LWPC effect would be obtained for the items in the 50% con-
gruent set. In this study, unlike previous studies, that effect was
in fact found, as was the LWPC effect for the biased set of
items. Interestingly, the size of the LWPC effect (MC interference–
MI interference) was larger for the biased set of items (62 ms),
for which both item-specific and list-level mechanisms could be
contributing, than the 50% congruent items (39 ms), for which
only list-level control could be contributing. This suggests that
the confound between ISPC and LWPC in most LWPC stud-
ies could inflate the size of the LWPC effect. The obtainment
of an LWPC effect for 50% congruent items was also theoreti-
cally important in revealing conditions under which the LWPC
effect reflects at least some contribution of list-level control and
in developing a measure (i.e., the LWPC effect on 50% congru-
ent trials) that permits researchers to selectively gage this control
strategy.
A similar conclusion emerged from the work of Hutchison
(2011). Like Bugg and Chanani (2011), Hutchison used items that
were matched in congruency, however, the congruency was not
50%; instead he examined items that were 67% (mostly congruent)
or 33% congruent (mostly incongruent) and which were embed-
ded in mostly congruent or mostly incongruent lists. Additionally,
for the mostly incongruent items, he varied whether or not items
were associated with a single high contingency response. LWPC
effects emerged when comparing interference across mostly con-
gruent and mostly incongruent lists for each item type, but were
strongest for mostly congruent items. This LWPC effect cannot
be accounted for by item-specific influences and highlights the
interaction of global control strategies with contingency learning
processes. Collectively, the findings of Hutchison, and those of
Bugg and Chanani, reinvigorated the list-level control account of
LWPC effects and the idea that global strategies are sometimes
used in resolving Stroop interference.
Following suit, Bugg et al. (2011b), sought converging evidence
for the operation of list-level control using a slightly different
method involving neutral trials (non-color words presented in dif-
ferent ink colors) that might be analogized to 50% congruent items
in prior methods (Bugg et al., 2008; Blais and Bunge, 2010; Bugg
and Chanani, 2011) in that they have no item-specific bias. Neu-
tral trials are 100% neutral regardless of the overall bias of the list
in which they reside. In their first experiment, neutral trials were
embedded in mostly congruent, mostly incongruent, and mostly
neutral lists, and six color-word stimuli were used so as to bias
participants away from relying on associative/contingency learn-
ing (Bugg and Chanani). Mostly neutral lists were included to gain
leverage on the question of what factors potentially trigger engage-
ment of a list-level control strategy. Some models propose that the
presence of a high degree of response conflict is a key determinant
of top-down control processes used to minimize interference (e.g.,
Botvinick et al., 2001). It is possible, however, that list-level con-
trol is engaged whenever the irrelevant (word) dimension has little
utility to responding, even when that dimension creates negligi-
ble response conflict (e.g., when most trials are neutral; cf. Melara
and Algom, 2003). On this view, evidence for list-level control
would be present in both the mostly incongruent and mostly neu-
tral lists relative to the mostly congruent list. Here, such evidence
would be a speeding of response times on neutral trials [in addi-
tion to reduced interference (i.e., incongruent-congruent RTs) in
the same conditions]. Indeed, this is precisely what was found sug-
gesting that a list-level strategy for attenuating interference such
as word filtering was engaged in both the mostly incongruent and
mostly neutral lists.
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In a second experiment, Bugg et al. (2011b) used a third method
for assessing the contributions of list-level control to the LWPC
effect. Participants performed a Stroop task with an LWPC manip-
ulation. However, they were also asked to perform a secondary
prospective memory task during the Stroop task. Participants
had to remember to press a response key (Stroop responses were
vocal) whenever they encountered the word HORSE. In a control
condition, participants pressed the response key whenever they
encountered a particular pattern surrounding the Stroop stimu-
lus. If participants implement a list-level word-filtering strategy
in the mostly incongruent list, then performance on the sec-
ondary task should be impaired but only when the secondary
task requires responding to a particular word and not when it
requires responding to a particular pattern. As expected, less
Stroop interference was observed in the mostly incongruent vs.
mostly congruent list. This finding, however, did not adjudi-
cate between item-specific and list-level processes because item-
specific control, for example, could produce a similar pattern.
Critically, the reduction in interference in the mostly incongruent
list was accompanied by impairment in secondary task perfor-
mance (relative to the mostly congruent list), and the impairment
was specific to the word HORSE condition. The fact that the
impairment was observed only for the word condition and not
for the pattern condition was important in ruling out accounts
of the impairment based on the difficulty of the ongoing Stroop
task, which some might argue is higher when most trials are
incongruent. These results further support the role of a list-level
control strategy that modulates word reading even prior to stim-
ulus onset; it is unclear how an item-specific mechanism that
acts post-stimulus onset would account for the pattern of find-
ings on neutral trials across the two experiments (Bugg et al.,
2011b).
CONTEXT-SPECIFIC PROPORTION CONGRUENT MANIPULATIONS
A different approach to evaluating the item-specific control and
contingency learning accounts stems from a third category of PC
manipulations, termed CSPC manipulations. Here, PC is varied
between different contexts in which the same items are presented.
If features of an item can rapidly trigger attentional filters tailored
to processing of particular items, then environmental cues that are
associated with particular items, such as the location context in
which an item appears, may also act as stimuli for triggering rapid-
online control over attentional filtering. In a seminal study, Crump
et al. (2006) used a prime-probe version of Stroop. A word (prime)
was presented at fixation followed by a congruent or incongruent
color patch (probe) that appeared randomly above or below fixa-
tion. The location of the color patch defined the context for the PC
manipulation. For example, probes appearing above fixation were
mostly congruent (75%) and probes appearing below fixation were
mostly incongruent (75%). As with ISPC procedures, LWPC was
50/50 congruent and incongruent. Here again, Stroop effects were
larger for probes appearing in the mostly congruent than mostly
incongruent locations. Such CSPC effects have also been observed
in a more traditional Stroop paradigm using font, rather than
location, as the contextual cue (Bugg et al., 2008). Importantly, in
these designs, all word-color pairs were presented with equal fre-
quency and rule out accounts based on stimulus-response learning
(e.g., associative/contingency). However, even in these designs an
event-frequency learning process sensitive to unique word-color-
location (or word-color-font) compounds could account for the
observed CSPC effects.
Crump and Milliken (2009) addressed the event-frequency
confound by manipulating PC both at the context and item-
level. Two item-types were defined: context and transfer items.
Context items carried the PC manipulation and were necessarily
frequency biased. For example, red and green Stroop items were
100% congruent when they appeared above fixation and 100%
incongruent when they appeared below fixation. Transfer items
were not frequency biased. For example, yellow and blue items
were 50% congruent and 50% incongruent in both locations. Both
context and transfer items were mixed together and presented ran-
domly in both locations within each block of trials. The question
of interest was whether the attentional filter applied to the con-
text items in their respective locations would generalize to the
frequency-unbiased transfer items appearing in those locations.
Indeed, CSPC effects were observed for the transfer items, with
larger Stroop effects for transfer items when they appeared in the
mostly congruent vs. mostly incongruent contexts. This transfer
effect provides a clear example of rapid, online, context-triggered
control adjustments.
PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FLANKER LITERATURE
The issues raised by PC research in the Stroop literature apply
across selective attention tasks. A common feature of attention
tasks is that they present participants with information selection
problems. The Stroop task measures ability to select word from
color information. The flanker task measures spatial attention abil-
ity to select central and ignore distracting peripheral information
(Eriksen and Eriksen, 1974). Typically participants identify a target
(e.g., a T or L) that is flanked by compatible (T T T) or incom-
patible (LTL) distractors. Responses are faster for compatible than
incompatible trials indicating a failure of distractor suppression.
As in the Stroop task, modulations to the size of the flanker effect
measure processes that adjust attention filters (albeit spatial fil-
ters) to enhance or suppress processing of peripheral information.
Thus, the flanker paradigm offers an opportunity to investigate
how various forms of control coordinate spatial attention.
List-wide proportion congruent, ISPC-like and CSPC manip-
ulations similar to those applied in Stroop have been shown to
control the size of the flanker effect (e.g., Miller, 1987; Cohen
et al., 1999; Corballis and Gratton, 2003; Lehle and Hübner, 2008;
Wendt et al., 2008). As is the case for the LWPC manipulation in
Stroop, the same manipulation in flanker tasks produces a simi-
lar pattern with larger compatibility effects for mostly compatible
than mostly incompatible lists (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992; Lehle and
Hübner, 2008, Experiment 2 Training Block performance; Taylor,
1977, Experiment 2; Wendt and Luna-Rodriguez, 2009). Unlike in
Stroop, however, researchers have yet to examine whether a list-
level strategy makes any contribution independent of item-specific
influences (e.g., item-specific control or contingency learning).
One possible reason this line of investigation has not been pursued
is because ISPC designs and effects have not received much focus
in flanker tasks and there has not been an empirical challenge to
list-level explanations. This is a ripe area for future investigation.
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In the realm of CSPC manipulations, by contrast, much work
has been done exploring the flanker task. For example, Corballis
and Gratton (2003) presented flanker items in different location
contexts correlated with different levels of PC. Larger compat-
ibility effects were observed for mostly congruent than mostly
incongruent contexts. The locations were to the left and right
of fixation because they were interested in determining whether
cognitive control processes could become lateralized across hemi-
spheres. Their hemispheric control hypothesis assumes that each
hemisphere is capable of representing distinct attentional sets for
controlling information specific to the processing demands of
information presented to each hemisphere. CSPC effects in flanker
tasks have been shown for up to four unique locations (Wendt et al.,
2008), indicating a rapid and flexible engagement of attentional
settings depending upon the location in which an item appears.
An important question that has been addressed in CSPC studies
concerns the types of contextual cues that are effective in pro-
ducing context-triggered control adjustments. In the initial study
of Crump et al. (2006), a striking asymmetry was observed such
that location but not shape-based contextual cues (i.e., whether
the color patch probe was a square or circle) produced CSPC
effects (for a similar pattern, see Crump et al., 2008). The fact that
location-based cues may be processed automatically (Logan, 1998)
offers one explanation for the asymmetry. Context-triggered con-
trol adjustments are presumed to occur very rapidly post-stimulus
onset, and subtle differences in the speed with which the context
is identified (i.e., location is faster than shape) could drive which
cues are useful signals of PC. Crump et al. (2008) tested another
explanation, the relevance hypothesis, which proposes that a par-
ticular contextual cue will be effective to the extent that is relevant
to the current task, and thus attended (Nissen and Bullemer,
1987). Crump et al. speculated that location-based information,
although nominally as irrelevant as shape in their prime-probe
Stroop paradigm, might generally receive greater attention due
to the importance of orienting to location in order to identify
other stimulus attributes (e.g., name color). To test their hypoth-
esis, shape was made relevant by asking participants to count the
number of probes that were squares (or circles) while performing
the Stroop task. Initial support for the relevance hypothesis was
obtained. The shape-based cue, which was previously ineffective
in triggering context-specific adjustments in control, produced a
CSPC effect when attention was directed to the shape dimension.
Lehle and Hübner (2008) examined whether another identity-
based cue, color, would produce a CSPC effect. They used a flanker
task that included numerals as stimuli, and participants judged
whether the central target was odd or even. Stimuli presented in
one color (e.g., green) were 80% congruent while stimuli presented
in the second color were 20% congruent. A 50 ms compatibility
effect was obtained but the magnitude of the compatibility effect
did not vary as a function of whether the stimuli appeared in
the mostly congruent or mostly incongruent color. The results of
their first experiment, thus, supported those of Crump et al. (2006,
2008), Experiment 1b) in showing an absence of an identity-based
CSPC effect. In a second experiment, however, Lehle and Hüb-
ner obtained the effect. The primary change was that participants
initially completed a set of training blocks wherein they experi-
enced a fixed association between stimulus color and PC. The goal
was for participants to learn the association between green and
80% congruent, for example, and red and 20% congruent prior to
performing the CSPC task, where green and red stimuli were ran-
domly intermixed. The size of the compatibility effect was similar
to Experiment 1 (54 ms); however, the effect was modulated by
CSPC with a smaller effect observed for stimuli presented in the
mostly incongruent color.
Color-based CSPC effects in the flanker task could depend on
the existence of pre-learned associations between color and PC;
however, the findings of Vietze and Wendt (2009) challenge this
view. A letter-based version of the flanker task (e.g., SSHSS) in
which stimuli were presented in yellow or green was used. One
color was associated with a high (or low, in separate blocks) level
of PC and the other was 50% congruent. Interference was reduced
for the stimuli associated with a low as compared to high PC. This
suggests that a color-based CSPC effect can be obtained without
any prior training on the associations between color and PC. An
alternative explanation is that context-level and list-level control
were both at play. When only one color within a block is biased
(high or low PC level) and the other is 50% congruent, the overall
list has a slight bias (e.g., 64% congruent or incongruent), unlike
the lists in typical CSPC paradigms (e.g., Crump et al., 2006, 2008;
Lehle and Hübner, 2008; Crump and Milliken, 2009). As such,
it is possible that part of the reduction in interference that was
observed for mostly incongruent colors involves use of advance
information (to alter attention) regarding the likelihood of inter-
ference within the list. Of course, if list-level control were making a
robust contribution, one would have expected a reduction in inter-
ference for the 50% congruent color when paired with a mostly
incongruent color as well (cf. Bugg and Chanani, 2011), and that
was not found.
Finally, researchers have also examined whether temporal infor-
mation can serve as a contextual cue for cognitive control adjust-
ments. At least one study has found that temporal information,
such as the duration of a fore period (200 vs. 1200 ms) pre-
ceding stimulus onset, is an effective cue for carrying the CSPC
manipulation (Wendt and Kiesel, 2011).
As in the Stroop task, researchers using priming procedures
similar to the flanker task have attempted to rule out explanations
of the CSPC effect pertaining to stimulus-frequency. Heinemann
et al. (2009,Experiment 1) employed a similar procedure as Crump
and Milliken (2009), examining whether context-specific control
adjustments would be observed for a set of frequency-unbiased
items (presented equally often in both contexts). They used a
prime-target paradigm in which the “flanker” preceded the target,
appearing in the same location as the target, rather than flank-
ing it. Judgments of whether the target was smaller or larger than
five were made on compatible (e.g., prime= 7 and target= 6) and
incompatible (e.g., prime= 7 and target= 4) trials in the presence
of a colored rectangle. The color of the rectangle was associated
with the PC level of the accompanying stimulus. Contrary to a
frequency-based account, the compatibility effect was smaller for
frequency-unbiased stimuli that were accompanied by the mostly
incongruent color than the mostly congruent color.
Heinemann et al. (2009) examined the role of conscious aware-
ness in the obtainment of the CSPC effect by weakly (Experiment
1) vs. strongly (Experiment 2) masking the prime. The context
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manipulation did not produce differential compatibility effects
when the prime was strongly masked. The authors concluded that
conscious access to the incompatible prime stimuli is necessary
for context-triggered adjustments in cognitive control, possibly
because access allows participants to determine the prime’s (dis-
tractor’s) utility to processing the target information, which allows
modulation of attention to the prime on subsequent trials. Note
that at first blush this may seem discrepant with findings that show
participants do not have conscious access to the PC manipulation
(i.e., cannot report the approximate proportion congruence for
each context, Crump et al., 2006). However, a subtle but impor-
tant difference is that even when primes are only barely visible,
this information may be sufficient for participants to develop an
implicit sense of PC even if they cannot consciously report the
identity of the prime.
Most recently, in a fMRI study, King et al. (2012) examined
the neurophysiological underpinnings of CSPC effects in a vari-
ant of flanker that used face-stimuli as targets and distractors,
and location as the cue to signal PC. Their task used unique faces
on every trial and thus ruled out S-R learning as an explanation
for their observed CSPC effects. Context-specific modulation of
flanker interference was tied to activity in the medial superior pari-
etal lobule that displayed functional coupling with visual regions
processing the flanker stimuli. They also showed that CSPC effects
depended on context repetitions across trials, and suggested that
context cues may not trigger online retrieval of attention settings,
but instead may instantiate or prime attentional sets that apply
forward when the context repeats.
PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE TASK-SWITCHING
LITERATURE
Task-switching costs – the finding that performance costs ensue
when switching rather than repeating a task– are influenced by
a range of processes from higher-level preparatory and strate-
gic processes to lower-level cue-encoding and priming processes.
Task-switching costs are influenced by list-wide proportion
manipulations. Note, however, that these manipulations do not
center on PC but instead on proportion repeat. Task-switch costs
are larger for high proportion task-repeat than for low proportion
task-repeat blocks of trials (Dreisbach et al., 2002; Dreisbach and
Haider, 2006; Schneider and Logan, 2006). Task-switching costs
are also influenced by item-specific proportion repeat manipula-
tions (Leboe et al., 2008). Task-switch costs are larger for items
associated with a high than low proportion of repeats. Task-
switching costs can also be influenced by contextual cues that are
predictive of particular tasks (Mayr and Bryck, 2005, 2007; Rubin
and Koch, 2006). For example, task-switching costs are reduced
when tasks appear in predictive contexts (such as location) rather
than in unpredictive contexts. These findings are very much in line
with the idea that stimulus information can retrieve attentional
control settings and apply them to adjust online performance. In
this case task-sets, rather than spatial attention or word-filtering
settings, are retrieved by contextual cues.
Somewhat more abstractly, task-switching costs are also influ-
enced by context-specific proportion repeat manipulations (Leboe
et al., 2008; Crump and Logan, 2010). Task-switch costs are larger
in the context associated with a high than low proportion of
task-repeats. In these cases, the contextual cue was not associ-
ated with a particular task, but instead associated with likelihood
of switching a task. One interpretation of this latter context effect
is that contextual cues can retrieve a signal that controls whether
or not a recently used task-set is retrieved and applied to current
performance.
CONTROL PROCESSES AND REPRESENTATIONS INVOLVED
IN LWPC, ISPC, AND CSPC EFFECTS
To take stock, PC effects can take several forms (list-wide, item-,
and context-specific), they are highly robust, and they have been
replicated both within and across paradigm boundaries in atten-
tion. For these reasons, we view PC manipulations as a useful tool
to better understand cognitive control processes in general. Earlier,
we forwarded the attention and action theory (Norman and Shal-
lice, 1986) as a tool to better classify levels of cognitive control. We
distinguished between proximal and distal forms of control and
endogenous and exogenous forms of control. In this section we
describe how different PC effects provide insight into these forms
of control.
SUPERVISORY CONTROL
Supervisory control refers collectively to those processes engaged
in strategic, endogenous, anticipatory, preparatory, proactive,
executive, or voluntary control. Supervisory control reflects oper-
ations of the elusive homunculus, where the intentions, plans, and
strategies voluntarily adopted by a performer direct, guide, and
coordinate how attention selects information in the environment.
Supervisory processes comprehend task-instructions and set over-
arching goals for task performance like speed-accuracy tradeoffs,
attention to task-relevant information, and application of task-
specific rules. Supervisory control monitors ongoing performance
and makes adjustments to the activation of action plans when
performance runs amok. Supervisory control is endogenous and
distally acts on the proximal control units that direct attention and
action. Similarly, in task-specific models of attentional selection,
like Stroop (Cohen et al., 1990, and in domain-general models of
attention (Bundesen, 1990; Logan, 2002), the setting of weights
that filter perceptual information is assumed to be under supervi-
sory control. The setting of weights is an endogenous act of control,
and the weights themselves refer to the proximal mechanisms that
filter information.
Supervisory processes are often invoked to explain LWPC
effects (e.g., Lowe and Mitterer, 1982). If participants become
aware of the manipulation, then they have every opportunity to
anticipate and prepare for upcoming congruent or incongruent
trials. In the context of Stroop, this would imply that participants
are capable of voluntarily adjusting the extent to which they sup-
press word information (Cheesman and Merikle, 1986; Balota and
Faust, 2001). This is plausible, as Raz et al. (2006) demonstrated
that highly suggestible subjects show reduced Stroop interference
when they are told to imagine words as not word-like. Strategic
control also requires effort to maintain attentional focus over the
course of the task, and it is well known that PC effects vary with
working memory capacity, presumably reflecting the fact that peo-
ple low in working memory capacity fail to consistently maintain
the attention settings required for their adopted strategy (Kane
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and Engle, 2003; but see Hutchison, 2011, for evidence of larger
LWPC effects for individuals with low working memory capacity).
Strategic control accounts assume awareness of the PC manipu-
lation, however participants may show list-wide effects even when
unaware of the manipulation. Blais et al. (2012) found that shifts in
cognitive control across mostly congruent and mostly incongru-
ent lists largely reflected implicit knowledge of PC. Participants
who were more aware of the LWPC manipulation were not more
likely to show a significantly larger LWPC effect, as might be
expected if participants were using a voluntary strategy based on
awareness of PC. An alternative idea is that of Melara and Algom
(2003) who refer to attention being differentially drawn to the
irrelevant dimension in mostly congruent vs. mostly incongru-
ent conditions depending on the irrelevant dimension’s utility to
responding. Note that no reference to voluntary filtering of the
irrelevant dimension is made per this very viable account. Instead,
the idea is that this biasing of attention occurs relatively auto-
matically when correlations are present between the relevant and
irrelevant dimension, as is the case when PC is manipulated [cf.
Kinoshita et al.’s, 2011, explanation of the effects of list-wide con-
gruency proportion on priming (with visible primes) that refers to
implicit tracking of the prime’s utility in predicting the response].
Item-specific proportion congruent and CSPC manipulations
typically do not invoke voluntary control, whereby participants
become aware of the associations between particular items or
contexts and their likelihood of congruency, and then use this
knowledge to prepare for upcoming trials. Most ISPC designs do
not probe awareness of the ISPC manipulation so it is not clear
whether participants have explicit knowledge of the manipulation.
In an ISPC-like paradigm, Schmidt et al. (2007) found that evi-
dence of the learning of four non-color-word contingencies was
present even in participants who were explicitly unaware of the
contingencies. Given that ISPC designs have many different items
(usually between 4 and 8), it seems unlikely that participants would
become aware of all of the item-specific associations.
It is perhaps easier to imagine that voluntary control could
account for CSPC effects (cf. Heinemann et al., 2009). Many CSPC
designs employ two contexts: high and low PC. It is possible that
participants become aware of the CSPC manipulation and simul-
taneously prepare two attentional sets, one for each context. On
this view, CSPC effects would reflect rapid voluntary switching
of attentional set in response to contextual information. How-
ever, participants are unable to explicitly report the proportions
of congruent and incongruent items in the high and low PC con-
texts (Crump et al., 2006). In the same set of studies, CSPC effects
were observed for location cues, but not for shape cues. Following
up, Crump et al. (2008) attempted to make shape cues effective
by informing participants about the CSPC manipulation. Partici-
pants signed a consent form indicating they were aware of which
shapes signaled high and low PC, however CSPC effects were not
observed. Interestingly, at the end of the experiment participants
were again probed for their knowledge of the manipulation, and
at this time they failed to report the correct proportions. This
leaves open the possibility that the awareness manipulation was
not strong enough, however it also underscores that participants
become absorbed with the task and lose knowledge of the CSPC
manipulation by the end of the task.
STIMULUS-DRIVEN CONTROL
Stimulus-driven control refers to exogenous cuing or triggering
of proximal representations coordinating attention and action.
Stimulus-driven control covers, but is not limited to, classic auto-
matic influences that occur in a rapid, non-voluntary, and stereo-
typed or inflexible manner. Well-known examples in attention
include interference from distracting word or spatial information
in Stroop or Flanker, attention capture by salient perceptual infor-
mation (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992), or peripheral visual cuing effects
(Posner and Cohen, 1984). Stimulus-driven control also guides
action in the context implicit sequence learning tasks (Nissen and
Bullemer, 1987), and broadly covers classical conditioning phe-
nomena in human and animal learning (Pavlov,1927; Rescorla and
Wagner, 1972). In these examples stimuli are assumed to capture
attentional resources or retrieve learned responses.
Stimulus-driven control processes are invoked to explain ISPC
and CSPC effects. Here features of the item or the item’s context
act as environmental cues. Cues trigger associated representa-
tions controlling attention and action. In the Norman and Shallice
(1986) theory stimuli retrieve action schemas. In the PC literature
stimuli are assumed to retrieve associated responses or atten-
tional settings (Jacoby et al., 2003). As we have discussed, a major
debate in the PC literature aims to adjudicate between contingency
learning accounts that invoke stimulus-response associations, and
stimulus-driven attentional control accounts that invoke stimulus-
attention associations in accounting for ISPC and CSPC effects.
These representational issues are summarized in the next section.
Aside from this debate, there is broad consensus that stimulus-
driven processes play an important role in PC effects, and in
guiding attention and action in general.
LOW AND HIGH LEVELS OF PROXIMAL CONTROL
Proximal control refers to those representations that are exoge-
nously or endogenously brought to bear in the direct control of
attention and action. The stimulus-response association is perhaps
the most classic example of a representation controlling action.
There is broad consensus that stimulus-response associations are a
fundamental building block of performance across attention and
action, and there is wide recognition that these representations
mediate some, but not all PC effects.
One of the major new insights into proximal control provided
by the PC literature could be termed the stimulus-attention associa-
tion. Conventionally, stimuli are assumed to be directly associated
with responses, whereas attentional settings are assumed to be
controlled by supervisory processes, and not associated with or
triggered by environmental cues. The stimulus-attention associ-
ation allows for the possibility that environmental cues can be
associated with and trigger the application of attentional filters
that, like responses, have been paired together during a learn-
ing experience. This kind of representation has been invoked to
explain ISPC and CSPC effects, whereby the features of the item
or contextual features rapidly trigger associated attentional filters
that modulate the size of congruency effects.
Stimulus-response and stimulus-attention associations point
to different levels of proximal control. Stimulus-response asso-
ciations can be considered as low-level proximal control. Low-
level refers to the notion that stimulus-response associations are
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well-learned, inflexible or stereotyped responses. Once triggered
they proceed with minimal internal ability to make adjustments to
action. The possibility of stimulus-attention representations sug-
gests a more flexible, higher level of proximal control. Whereas
stimulus-response associations can be highly stereotyped with
stimuli retrieving only those specific actions paired in the past,
stimulus-attention associations can allow for flexible control by
triggering generalizable attentional filters that allow selection
processes to transfer across items.
The PC literature has developed precise methods to identify
effects that show evidence for stimulus-attention representations,
but it is not alone in providing supporting evidence. Contextual
cues can direct attention toward target location in visual search
(Chun and Jiang, 1998). Long-term negative priming (DeSchep-
per and Treisman, 1996; Grison et al., 2005), long-term inhibition
of return effects (Tipper et al., 2003), long-term aftereffects in
the stop-signal task (Verbruggen and Logan, 2008), and long-term
priming of pop-out effects in attention capture (Thomson and
Milliken, 2012a,b) show that stimuli can retrieve attentional filters
applied to them from the recent and distant past. Last, prior expe-
rience with viewing natural scenes controls eye-movements and
sampling of information from familiar images (Ryan et al., 2007).
All of these examples demonstrate stimulus-driven control over
a variety of attention processes and further support a distinction
between low and high levels of proximal control.
The nature of stimulus-attention representations are currently
not well understood. Crump and Milliken (2009) forwarded an
episodic account whereby memory encodes the stimulus, response,
contextual features, and attentional procedures or filters employed
during performance. In this way, contextual information in the
task environment can cue retrieval of attentional settings used
in the past and apply them to control online processing in the
present. This account acknowledges stimulus-driven control as a
process that guides selective attention. As well, the account assumes
enriched memory representations that not only code stimulus-
response information, but also code the history of attentional
operations that have been applied during performance. In this way,
the account is similar to the event-files account Spape and Hommel
(2008) forwarded to explain the selectivity of sequential modula-
tions of the auditory Stroop effect. The modulations were limited
to sequences in which the to-be-ignored word (“high” or “low”)
was spoken by the same voice on trial n− 1 and trial n. Speaker
voice was apparently a (contextual) feature to which the atten-
tional control operations associated with trial n− 1 were bound
(along with actions, etc.). Only when the same voice was spoken
on trial n were the attentional operations reactivated, leading to a
performance benefit.
A critical as yet untested assumption of these accounts is that
the attentional filters triggered by stimuli are themselves bound
together in records of prior experience (e.g., in an episode or
event file) that code stimulus, response, and attentional filter-
ing information. With respect to the attention and action theory,
this assumption is akin to saying that the contention sched-
uling system codes more than stimulus-response units, it also
codes stimulus-attention units or perhaps stimulus-attention-
response units. An alternative possibility is that attention fil-
ters are not bound in a long or short-term episodic record,
but that they trigger application of attentional sets maintained
outside of contention scheduling. Part of the distinction rests
on whether the stimulus-triggered adjustment occurs during
retrieval of bound attentional filters that are integrated into online
attentional sets, or whether multiple attentional sets are main-
tained online and stimuli bias application of existing attentional
sets. This distinction is made apparent in differing computa-
tional accounts of PC effects that are described in the next
section.
COMPUTATIONAL ACCOUNTS
List-wide and item-level PC effects have been discussed in more
formal computational models. The aim of these models fits well
with the aims of abandoning the conventional controlled vs. auto-
matic dichotomy, and more precisely defining the processes under-
lying PC effects and cognitive control in general. Perhaps the most
well known of extant computational models of PC effects is the
conflict-monitoring account (Botvinick et al., 2001). According
to this account, the anterior cingulate acts as a conflict-monitor,
a cumulative recorder of conflict on all preceding trials. When
conflict is frequent, as in a mostly incongruent list, the anterior
cingulate signals regions such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to
increase its top-down influence on performance. The notion of
a conflict-monitoring system also challenges the controlled vs.
automatic dichotomy as the monitoring system enacts control
on an automatic basis driven by conflict signals. The control is
endogenous in the sense that its origin stems from the process-
ing of conflict signals, and these signals feed global, top-down
adjustments buffering against conflict in the immediate future.
Botvinick et al. characterize this global influence as heightened
processing of the relevant dimension (see also Egner and Hirsch,
2005), though accounts positing heightened top-down filtering of
the word dimension are equally viable (Lindsay and Jacoby, 1994).
Conflict-based adjustments are partly distal in the sense that the
monitoring system acts on the attention processes filtering the rel-
evant or irrelevant dimension, and they are partly proximal in the
sense that there is a kind of closed processing loop between conflict
detection and subsequent adjustment.
The conflict-monitoring account successfully anticipates the
LWPC effect, including the finding of this effect for congruency-
matched items (e.g., 50%, Bugg and Chanani, 2011; 67 or 33%,
Hutchison, 2011) and neutral trials (Bugg et al., 2011b). In addi-
tion to explaining the LWPC effect via a global heightening of top-
down control in mostly incongruent lists, the conflict-monitoring
account might also explain the effect via a reactive heightening of
control, otherwise known as conflict-adaptation. LWPC manipu-
lations necessarily bias the number of trials that are preceded by
an incongruent trial. For example, in mostly incongruent blocks,
most trials are preceded by an incongruent trial. This leaves open
the possibility that smaller congruency effects in mostly incon-
gruent vs. mostly congruent blocks are driven by conflict-driven
adjustments on a local, trial-to-trial basis. Such an explanation
may be less likely to account for LWPC effects on congruency-
matched items or neutral items, however, when such items do not
share overlapping features (relevant or irrelevant) with the items
that establish the bias of the list (i.e., those items that are presented
as incongruent on 75% of trials in a mostly incongruent list).
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Conflict-adaptation effects are more fickle under such conditions
(e.g., Mayr et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006).
The conflict-monitoring account has difficulty accounting for
ISPC and CSPC effects. Most ISPC and CSPC designs balance
congruent and incongruent items at the list-wide level. In other
words, conflict occurs on 50% of trials within a list, and the degree
of conflict present in a given list is equivalent for all items. The
finding of differential interference effects for different items or
contexts is therefore difficult to reconcile with a model that posits
a global level of top-down control across the list. In addition, in the
case of ISPC and CSPC manipulations, the number of trials that
follow incongruent items is also balanced such that it is unlikely
that sequential effects such as conflict-adaptation can account for
the corresponding effects. As a case in point, Crump et al. (2006)
reported a sequential analysis in their CSPC design. They found
significant sequential effects – the Stroop effect was smaller for tri-
als following incongruent than congruent trials – however, these
did not interact with the CSPC effect (see also Vietze and Wendt,
2009, for a similar pattern in their study on color-based CSPC
effects in the flanker task).
Several researchers have recently forwarded computational
models that include item-specific mechanisms in an attempt
to provide alternatives to the conflict-monitoring model. For
instance, Blais et al. (2007) proposed an item-specific conflict-
monitoring account of ISPC effects. The model assumes that con-
flict signals are item-specific rather than general. The model also
assumes a role for online maintenance of multiple, item-specific
attentional sets, and thus does not assume that online-adjustments
are driven by memory retrieval processes. When conflict is fre-
quently experienced for a given item (e.g., GREEN is shown
frequently in white), control adjustments are made only to the
relevant pathway for the specific item generating the conflict (e.g.,
attention to the color white is boosted for the word GREEN).
Mostly incongruent items frequently cause conflict, which in
turn triggers conflict-induced adjustments for those items, lead-
ing to smaller interference effects relative to mostly congruent
items. Recent findings showing that item-specific control, when
dissociated from contingency learning mechanisms, has a selec-
tive or more pronounced influence on incongruent trials (Bugg
et al., 2011a; Bugg and Hutchison, 2012) lend support to the idea
that conflict plays a role in triggering item-specific adjustments.
Interestingly, this pattern is not consistently observed in CSPC
paradigms that index context-specific control (e.g., Crump et al.,
2006), which raises the question of whether context-specific con-
trol adjustments are triggered by the occurrence of conflict. It is
possible that access to the contextual cues, perhaps especially in
the case of location, occurs sufficiently rapidly such that control
adjustments are triggered prior to the detection of conflict. This
remains to be explored in future modeling efforts.
Another open question is how the item-specific conflict-
monitoring model accounts for transfer in ISPC and possibly
CSPC paradigms. If the model boosts control only for the specific
item (word-color compound) producing conflict, then transfer
would seem unlikely given that transfer trials typically include an
old word paired with a new color (or picture) or an old color (or
picture) paired with a new word (e.g., Crump and Milliken, 2009;
Bugg et al., 2011a; Bugg and Hutchison, 2012).
An appeal of the model of Blais et al. (2007) is that it success-
fully models not only ISPC but also LWPC effects. However, with
regard to the latter, it is important to note that the LWPC effects
that were modeled were confounded with ISPC effects. Thus, it
is uncertain whether the item-specific conflict-monitoring model
can account for more “pure” indicators of list-level control such as
LWPC effects for congruency-matched items (Bugg and Chanani,
2011; Hutchison, 2011). It seems rather unlikely, given that the
congruency-matched items are identical in the mostly congru-
ent and mostly incongruent lists (Bugg and Chanani; Hutchison).
Because conflict is identical for these items across lists, similar lev-
els of interference should be observed according to the model. Sim-
ilarly, it is unlikely that conflict-adaptation effects resulting from
item-specific conflict can account for the LWPC effect observed
for congruency-matched items. In the study of Bugg and Chanani,
congruency-matched items shared no features (relevant or irrele-
vant) with the items that established the bias of the list. According
to the item-specific conflict-monitoring model, such adjustments
would influence performance on the subsequent trial only when
the word repeats (Blais et al., 2007), and the word never repeated
when transitioning from a high conflict (biased) to a 50% congru-
ent item (see also Hutchison, 2011). By contrast, another model
that includes an item-specific component, here one that reflects
a conflict modulated Hebbian learning rule, accommodates both
item-specific and item-non-specific adaptation (e.g., sequential
effects on non-repeating items; Verguts and Notebaert, 2008). As
such, it accounts for the ISPC effect. Additionally, it might accom-
modate the LWPC effect for congruency-matched and neutral
items if the sequential effects on the non-repeating trials in the
paradigms that have revealed these LWPC effects are sufficiently
robust. The model does, however, require an additional assump-
tion to account for such effects, namely that there is a little bit
of carry-over of the top-down control settings from trial n− 1 to
trial n.
OPEN ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
The already rich PC literature might be expanded in several the-
oretically important ways that would enhance our understanding
of the many faces of cognitive control. For instance, PC designs
involve learning about stimulus-response and stimulus-attention
associations. It remains unclear whether these associations are
formed by the same learning processes, and are established at the
same rate. There is some evidence to suggest they may not be.
For example, Jacoby et al. (2003) found that the contingency-
confounded ISPC effect was present within just 16 trials. By
contrast, Crump et al. (2006) and Bugg et al. (2008) found that
their CSPC effects, believed to reflect stimulus-attention associ-
ations, developed more slowly, and in some cases these effects
interacted with block (i.e., were not observed in initial blocks but
grew stronger with time).
Second, PC effects have been studied in single session designs
where the learning occurs inside the experimental session. It
remains unclear whether these learning experiences establish
long-term associations that would continue to influence perfor-
mance a day or a month in the future, similar to the types
of effects that have been observed in other attention para-
digms (e.g., see DeSchepper and Treisman, 1996, for evidence
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of negative priming at a 1 month interval). Similarly, stimulus-
attention associations may be useful for particular items and
contexts in specific situations, and new stimulus-attention asso-
ciations may be required when task demands change at the
item or context level. The time-course with which old stimulus-
attention associations interfere with learning of new stimulus-
attention associations remains an open question for future
research.
A third open issue concerns the experience of conflict and the
formation of associations. There is some evidence that learn-
ing about PC not only depends on item-frequency, but also
depends on experiencing conflict during the learning experi-
ence. For example, Crump et al. (2008) showed a location-based
CSPC effect in a Stroop color-naming task with word primes and
color patch probes, but CSPC effects were not observed when
the task was reversed (word naming with color patch primes
and word probes). The word-naming version of the Stroop task
reduces the experience of conflict, and suggests that conflict
may play an important role in the learning of stimulus-attention
associations.
Broadly speaking, we have endorsed the view that ISPC and
CSPC effects reflect stimulus-driven control whereby item or
context-level cues trigger attentional adjustments. This shows
that stimulus-attention associations can be tailored for specific
items, and for classes of items that appear in similar contexts. The
principles guiding reliance on item- or context-specific stimulus-
attention associations remain unclear, however. For example, as
noted above, it is not certain whether item and context-level
control adjustments are both conflict triggered, nor is it clear
when item-level associations would dominate over context associ-
ations or vice versa. Bugg et al. (2008) found that when words
(an item-level signal) and font (a contextual signal) were cor-
related with PC, the PC effect was no larger than when words
independently signaled PC, which might be interpreted as pre-
liminary support for the dominance of item-specific signals of
control.
Another issue is that PC designs, especially those examining
manipulations other than LWPC, have largely been carried out
in behavioral paradigms (but see Blais and Bunge, 2010; King
et al., 2012). The neural substrates coding stimulus-attention
associations remain unspecified. Imaging studies may be par-
ticularly advantageous for examining whether control is indeed
anticipatory/preparatory in the context of LWPC manipulations
vs. stimulus-driven in the context of ISPC and CSPC manip-
ulations. Methodologies are available that permit the examina-
tion of sustained activation patterns, which one would expect to
accompany list-level control, and transient activation patterns,
which should characterize the item- and context-level adjust-
ments. Moreover, it would be advantageous to examine the time-
course of LWPC, ISPC, and CSPC effects. Cleary, the latter two
reflect very rapid control adjustments, but it is not certain whether
the time courses differ for ISPC and CSPC effects, or whether
the trigger for such adjustments is a perceptual feature (e.g.,
shape differences such as font, Bugg et al., 2008) as opposed to
the conflict associated with processing of the irrelevant dimen-
sion. These questions could be addressed using event-related
potentials.
Finally, there is much room for application of the range of PC
manipulations to other tasks in which it would be theoretically
advantageous to isolate voluntary control from stimulus-driven
mechanisms, and vice versa. There is evidence of LWPC effects
in the Simon task (e.g., Hommel, 1994; Toth et al., 1995), which
shares some features with the Stroop and flanker tasks to which
we devoted much attention. Determining whether PC manipu-
lations are useful for examining cognitive control in tasks that
are quite different from Stroop and flanker (e.g., task-switching;
Go No-Go) is a necessary next step in evaluating whether the
levels of control concepts presented herein might have broader
appeal.
FINAL THOUGHTS
People learn to optimize their performance in a complex and
unruly world. It is increasingly clear that multiple levels of control
guide performance during and after learning. We have distin-
guished broadly between endogenous vs. exogenous and proximal
vs. distal aspects of control. Endogenous control highlights oppor-
tunity for volition to guide performance, and exogenous control
highlights opportunity to offload control to the environment.
Both endogenous and exogenous control act distally on the many
kinds of proximal control representations that allow attention to
filter relevant from irrelevant information and the motor sys-
tem to guide action. The relationships between levels of control
and the extent to which different control processes contribute to
performance are not well understood.
On the one hand, investigating multiple levels of control
calls for researchers to study each level independently. This
involves a terminology of control that permits fine distinctions
between levels and experimental rigor to create process pure mea-
surements of each process. The PC literature is an illustration
of the difficulty in achieving this rigor. Nevertheless, such an
approach could potentially answer quantitative questions about
control-based adjustments. For example, do voluntary, conflict-
based, or stimulus-driven forms of adjusting attention all have
the same power to change attentional settings? The approach
might also encourage researchers to experimentally disentangle
contributions of stimulus-response, stimulus-attention, conflict-
based, and voluntary processes potentially mediating effects of
interest.
On the other hand, it would be unfortunate if by dividing-
and-conquering the territory of cognitive control it would be
left without some theme of unification. Investigating multiple
levels of control also calls for researchers to clarify relation-
ships between levels. Do different forms of control act on the
same proximal mechanisms of control? Do these forms of con-
trol operate exclusively from each other or are they interre-
lated over the course of learning? For example, are stimulus-
attention associations formed strictly by incidental or implicit
learning processes, or do they reflect a learning process that
associates voluntary control of attention together with particular
cues eventually mediating stimulus-driven control? We encour-
age both approaches, investigating the nuances of different forms
of control and how they act in concert as paths toward under-
standing the manifold ways that cognitive control coordinates
performance.
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